Reading 1: Van Hirsch
Ami Palmer
Ok, guys. Here are some of my own reflections from reading assignments in grad school...Ok, this is a little embarrassing but if it helps you guys, then it's worth it...
Question/Issue 1
On pp. 71-72 (and other places) Van Hirsch discusses proportionality and the “why punish?” question. Within the context of offering a preventative argument to answer why we should punish, he points out that the principle of fairness still requires that we bring in proportionality of punishment in relation to censure. This and other arguments seem to be arguing for proportionality of punishment to moral censure from the point of view of the state/society.
I'm curious about how these arguments look from the point of view of the wrongdoer, or even if his point of view matters. Suppose there's a wrongdoer who doesn't share the moral sentiments of the majority—perhaps he's a “hardened criminal”. He's not going to be responsive to the arguments for the severity of his punishment because he either doesn't care or doesn't share the same intuitions about how reprehensible the act was. Does this matter for von Hirsch? Does it matter why he might not share the intuitions of blameworthiness? What if it's because he's like Murphy's paradigmatic member of the underclass? This isn't really an objection to what Hirsch is saying, I'm more curious about where the wrongdoer's notions of blameworthiness about his crime fit into the picture (beyond simply “recognizing him as a moral agent”).
Question/Issue 2
On pp. 75-76 von Hirsch discusses the “range only” view of allocating punishment based on blameworthiness mediated by preventative concerns. The amount of punishment will only have an upper and lower limit with the (possible) objectionable outcome that “a defendant who commits a less serious crime can receive comparatively the greater penalty if preventative concerns so dictate”. My question here is if this is really a problem. Yes this is the outcome but I don't see why it is necessarily objectionable. His objection elicits an intuitive response, but how we should treat this intuition is another matter. It seems like the assumption here is that fairness requires that the range must always be greater than the degree of variation provided by prevention, otherwise there's unequal condemnation. Why can't we say, “we condemn each equally but because this guy is likely going to reoffend, we're going to keep him off the streets--so he gets a bonus sentence added on”? Maybe I've misunderstood the argument.
On pp. 75-76 von Hirsch discusses the “range only” view of allocating punishment based on blameworthiness mediated by preventative concerns. The amount of punishment will only have an upper and lower limit with the (possible) objectionable outcome that “a defendant who commits a less serious crime can receive comparatively the greater penalty if preventative concerns so dictate”. My question here is if this is really a problem. Yes this is the outcome but I don't see why it is necessarily objectionable. His objection elicits an intuitive response, but how we should treat this intuition is another matter. It seems like the assumption here is that fairness requires that the range must always be greater than the degree of variation provided by prevention, otherwise there's unequal condemnation. Why can't we say, “we condemn each equally but because this guy is likely going to reoffend, we're going to keep him off the streets--so he gets a bonus sentence added on”? Maybe I've misunderstood the argument.
Question/Issue 3
On pp. 83 von Hirsch discusses other factors that are relevant for locating the scale's anchoring points. An interesting consideration is “the goal of reducing the suffering visited on offenders”. I find this perplexing because it would seem the notions of punishment and suffering go hand in hand. Is he suggesting we should always find a way to punish that minimizes suffering? What is the appropriate amount (if any) of suffering? If the suffering is more intense does this mean the sentence can be shortened? If it's less suffering is the sentence longer? I'm a little unsure about what von Hirsch's position is on the relationship between suffering and punishment, and how/if that would influence duration of punishment.
On pp. 83 von Hirsch discusses other factors that are relevant for locating the scale's anchoring points. An interesting consideration is “the goal of reducing the suffering visited on offenders”. I find this perplexing because it would seem the notions of punishment and suffering go hand in hand. Is he suggesting we should always find a way to punish that minimizes suffering? What is the appropriate amount (if any) of suffering? If the suffering is more intense does this mean the sentence can be shortened? If it's less suffering is the sentence longer? I'm a little unsure about what von Hirsch's position is on the relationship between suffering and punishment, and how/if that would influence duration of punishment.
Reading 2: Morris
Ami Palmer
Objection 1
My first issue concerns the section where Morris give the four counter-examples to the desert-equality principle as a defining principle. Perhaps I'm misunderstanding something but it seems like he and his opponents are talking past each other. I understand him to be be giving a description of areas in the justice system where other considerations over-ride the desert-equality principle. That is, he's describing how things are now. One approach the desert-equality proponents could take would be simply to swallow the bitter pill and say, “yes, these are transgressions of the principle but we object to them (the transgressions)”. Similarly, I'm not clear why the desert-equality advocate can't respond that they are presenting an ideal.
Objection 2
pp. 189-191 Morris discusses his “purse-snatcher” sentencing guidelines as counter-example to the desert-equality principle. He argues based on utilitarian/considerations of parsimony that changing sentencing guidelines to make them ostensibly more equal (a) doesn't always achieve this end and (b) is primarily motivated by considerations other than equality. To this argument perhaps the desert-equality advocate could reply that this principle doesn't necessarily commit him a scenario such as Morris describes (probation to 6 months gets changed to 2 months for everyone). It's not clear how narrow or wide the range of punishment needs to be on the desert-equality model. Perhaps, a review by the sentencing commission determines that probation to 6 months falls within the acceptable range of “desert-equality”.
It might be a stretch for this particular example, but there's no logical reason this can't be argued. Morris can reply that his counter-example mirrors what actually happens and so, logical possibility doesn't play into it. At this point the desert-theorist might have to bite the bullet and just declare that it's analytic that the only thing that matters in determining equality of sentence proportional to desert is that the sentences be of the same duration—despite what may or may not occur in the world.
It might be a stretch for this particular example, but there's no logical reason this can't be argued. Morris can reply that his counter-example mirrors what actually happens and so, logical possibility doesn't play into it. At this point the desert-theorist might have to bite the bullet and just declare that it's analytic that the only thing that matters in determining equality of sentence proportional to desert is that the sentences be of the same duration—despite what may or may not occur in the world.
Short Response to Marxism and Retribution
Ami Palmer
Ami Palmer
Murphy's central argument is that (a) although the (Kantian-ish) retributive theory of punishment is generally correct, (b) it is “materially inadequate”. Materially inadequate, in this context, means that the social conditions which the theory presupposes have not obtained, rendering the theory inapplicable. While I generally agree with the conclusion (b), I have issue with (a)--in particular how it was arrived at.
To establish the veracity of a Kantian retributive theory of punishment, Murphy pits it against its main opponent--utilitarianism. By showing the supposed problems with utilitarian theories of punishment, the retributive theory is the only plausible candidate left standing. However, Murphy distorts utilitarianism to a degree such that even Paul Ryan would blush. By arguing against a caricature of his opponent and suggesting interpretations that are demonstrably false, Murphy's arguments in many places simply don't apply, thereby weakening his case for a retributivist theory—at least on the grounds that utilitarianism fails as miserably as he claims.
Although there are several, I will select two primary misconceptions Murphy has about utilitarianism. (1). The first—although implied throughout--is spelled out in footnote 5 where Murphy claims that utilitarians “admit only one principle—namely do that which on the whole maximizes utility”1 (p. 221). In response I cede the floor to Mill who in the following section is responding to the exact same charge laid by his critics 150 years ago:
To establish the veracity of a Kantian retributive theory of punishment, Murphy pits it against its main opponent--utilitarianism. By showing the supposed problems with utilitarian theories of punishment, the retributive theory is the only plausible candidate left standing. However, Murphy distorts utilitarianism to a degree such that even Paul Ryan would blush. By arguing against a caricature of his opponent and suggesting interpretations that are demonstrably false, Murphy's arguments in many places simply don't apply, thereby weakening his case for a retributivist theory—at least on the grounds that utilitarianism fails as miserably as he claims.
Although there are several, I will select two primary misconceptions Murphy has about utilitarianism. (1). The first—although implied throughout--is spelled out in footnote 5 where Murphy claims that utilitarians “admit only one principle—namely do that which on the whole maximizes utility”1 (p. 221). In response I cede the floor to Mill who in the following section is responding to the exact same charge laid by his critics 150 years ago:
It is a strange notion that the acknowledgment of a first principle is inconsistent with the admission of secondary ones [...]. Whatever we adopt as the fundamental principle of morality, we require subordinate principles to apply it by [...]. There exists no moral system under which there do not arise unequivocal cases of conflicting obligation. These are real difficulties, the knotty points both in the theory and in conscientious guidance of personal conduct. [...] There is no case of moral obligation in which some secondary principle is not involved [...]. (Mill, Utilitarianism: p. 113-115)
I could go on but I think these quotes sufficient to make the point that even the classical utilitarians had a more nuanced view of morality than fervent adherence to one single principle—and they certainly weren't blind to moral dilemmas.
The last distortion I will address is the contention that “the utilitarian theory cannot capture [...] the notion of persons having rights” (p. 220). Upon reading this I have to wonder if Murphy is not moonlighting as a reporter at a “certain” news company. Are we seriously supposed to accept, that Mill (for example) had no notion of rights? Was it not a utilitarian who wrote On Liberty, the most influential document on individual rights? To claim that utilitarianism cannot or does not capture the notion of individual rights is pure fantasy! (Excuse my less-than-scholarly tone.) The principle of charity compels me to allow that Murphy might reply that the principle of utility can over-ride rights. Maybe. But more likely, Mill meant for “utility to be invoked to decide between them when their demands are incompatible” (Mill, Utilitarianism: p. 115. My italics).
Ok, I'll end there lest I come off as a ranting utilitarian. Actually, I don't subscribe to any particular moral theory, but what I object to in Murphy is the blatant distortion and misrepresentation of his opponents' position. Such a strategy only undermines his “conclusion” that utilitarianism can't adequately handle the moral issues involved in punishment.
Ok, I'll end there lest I come off as a ranting utilitarian. Actually, I don't subscribe to any particular moral theory, but what I object to in Murphy is the blatant distortion and misrepresentation of his opponents' position. Such a strategy only undermines his “conclusion” that utilitarianism can't adequately handle the moral issues involved in punishment.
1I'll ignore the even more disingenuous claim that utilitarians are “[blind] to the possibility of genuine moral dilemmas”.
Student Samples
General tips for good writing
Here are some samples of a student reflections which contains many the key elements I'm looking for in a reflection:
(a) It has an accurate, clear, and concise summary of the main argument (you are also welcome to focus on a particular argument which you will address in your analysis);
(b) The author points out a possible problem with Goldman's position;
(c) The author suggests a possible reply Goldman might give;
(d) The author shows how the possible reply doesn't meet his original objection.
As I've mentioned in class, there are several possible formats your reflection can follow, this is only one. Most importantly, it shows understanding of and philosophical engagement with the argument.
SAMPLE 2
Emily Masek
PHIL 101 – 1007
Week 15 Reflection
Greene discusses the prospect of combining moral philosophy and moral psychology into a
“naturalized ethics” to better evaluate issues within normative and meta-ethics; while we cannot
“derive moral principles from scientific facts,” it is plausible to use empirical data to better understand
human morality (544). He maintains how cases involving conflicting moral intuitions, yet seemingly
equal moral obligation (the bleeding hiker vs. the charitable donation) may result from the brain's
tendency to be more altruistic to “personal” rather than “impersonal” needs, as observed in a brain-
imaging experiment (545). He then asserts that belief in moral realism is not “an insight into the nature
of moral truth,” but a result of the moral perceptiveness that humans evolved to thrive socially (547).
In saying that moral convictions are derived from “projections of moral attitudes” rather than
“perceptions of moral truth,” Greene argues that there are no objective morals (547). Rather, he implies
that morals could be considered “experiential qualities,” just as conceptions of beauty are (546).
However, it may not be entirely appropriate to compare conceptions of these perceived qualities with
conceptions of morality, as those qualities do not concern such “dire matters” (like life and death and
societal order) while morals do. Thus, it could be argued that moral perceptions are of a different
nature than aesthetic perceptions and not necessarily subjective.
Also, in his discussion of the evolution of humanity's morality he implies that humans' moral
behaviors arose out of a need to thrive in “our intensely social lives” (547). One may derive from his
argument that certain moral guidelines (like those against murder) have survived the test of time,
allowing humanity to progress to where it is now. Greene would argue that these were formulated by
the “efficient cognitive processes” that came from our need to survive socially (547), but the reverse
could be argued also: that murder negatively affects society because there is a universal law against it,
and our “efficient cognitive processes” could be faculties for observing the nature of this law.
SAMPLE 5:
Emily Masek
PHIL 101 – 1007
14 October 2013
Week 8 Reflection
In this reading, Peter van Inwagen describes what is called the “Argument from Evil,” the argument that a God who is omniscient, omnipotent and morally perfect could not exist if evil is present in the world. Van Inwagen, however, objects to this notion, explaining that God could desire to rid the world of evil, but He may nonetheless have reasons for allowing it that “outweigh the desirability of the non-existence of evil” (p. 31). He then argues that God, by allowing humans to have total free will, consequently allows for the possibility of evil to occur through its abuse (p. 34). Finally, he brings up the account of man's fall as described in Genesis and how the events leading up to Jesus Christ were part of God's “plan of reconciliation” and that canceling evil would only frustrate it (p. 35).
Van Inwagen argues that God must allow for a “total” sort of free will, where God gives someone a
choice between x and y but God cannot ensure that he choose either x or y (p. 33). But while van Inwagen argues that this may not interfere with God's omnipotence, he does not mention whether it would interfere with His omniscience (His knowledge of all things). If God knows the future and thus knows exactly what you will choose to do, then in effect He does determine your course of action either by not stopping you or by intervening in some way that we cannot observe, thus implying determinism. Van Inwagen does not want this, so in order to call for total free will van Inwagen must explain why it would be compatible with God's omniscience.
Also, there is one argument that van Inwagen could have used to make a stronger point. While he
explained the importance of knowing “the nature of free will” (p. 33), he could have also explained the
importance of knowing the nature of evil. Just as cold is the absence of heat, evil can be seen as the absence of good; thus, he may have argued that good and evil must coexist in order for either of them to exist at all. Therefore, good would not exist in any form on earth without the presence of evil; or, at the very least, humans would not fully appreciate good things if God had not allowed evil in order for the two to be contrasted, just as one cannot fully make out a light if there is no surrounding darkness.
Student Samples
General tips for good writing
Here are some samples of a student reflections which contains many the key elements I'm looking for in a reflection:
(a) It has an accurate, clear, and concise summary of the main argument (you are also welcome to focus on a particular argument which you will address in your analysis);
(b) The author points out a possible problem with Goldman's position;
(c) The author suggests a possible reply Goldman might give;
(d) The author shows how the possible reply doesn't meet his original objection.
As I've mentioned in class, there are several possible formats your reflection can follow, this is only one. Most importantly, it shows understanding of and philosophical engagement with the argument.
SAMPLE 1:
Trevor Sherwood
9-4-2013 Phil 101
Reflection Week 2: Goldman
Goldman’s argument mostly consists of whether or not a belief is justified. According to him as long as the belief that’s believed was made by a reliable process it is justified. Regardless if you knew how the belief was produced or evidence of that the belief was made by a process that was reliable.
Goldman stated in his paper that; “ it may be suggested that the proper criterion of justifiedness is a propensity of the process to generate beliefs that are true in a non-manipulated environment, i.e., an environment in which there is no purposeful arrangement of the world either to record our conflict with the beliefs that are formed. In other words, the suitability of a belief forming process is only a function of the success in “natural” situations”. (Pg 12 of document) How do you know if something is absolutely true even if it is in a non-manipulated environment? Imperfect things happen in nature so whether or not it happens in a non-manipulated environment doesn’t necessarily mean that the belief is 100% true.
Goldman did say that this “national environment” would not be a situation involving a powerful “demonesque” type creature or other type of controlling being; however he did not assure us of how the belief is justified. While that it’s true that something in a non-manipulated environment would be more plausible than an environment that has been altered or controlled Goldman’s point still does not guarantee justification. Whether or not the amount of evidence is substantial enough to warrant the justification of the belief doesn’t mean that belief is entirely unjustifiable in its processes.
9-4-2013 Phil 101
Reflection Week 2: Goldman
Goldman’s argument mostly consists of whether or not a belief is justified. According to him as long as the belief that’s believed was made by a reliable process it is justified. Regardless if you knew how the belief was produced or evidence of that the belief was made by a process that was reliable.
Goldman stated in his paper that; “ it may be suggested that the proper criterion of justifiedness is a propensity of the process to generate beliefs that are true in a non-manipulated environment, i.e., an environment in which there is no purposeful arrangement of the world either to record our conflict with the beliefs that are formed. In other words, the suitability of a belief forming process is only a function of the success in “natural” situations”. (Pg 12 of document) How do you know if something is absolutely true even if it is in a non-manipulated environment? Imperfect things happen in nature so whether or not it happens in a non-manipulated environment doesn’t necessarily mean that the belief is 100% true.
Goldman did say that this “national environment” would not be a situation involving a powerful “demonesque” type creature or other type of controlling being; however he did not assure us of how the belief is justified. While that it’s true that something in a non-manipulated environment would be more plausible than an environment that has been altered or controlled Goldman’s point still does not guarantee justification. Whether or not the amount of evidence is substantial enough to warrant the justification of the belief doesn’t mean that belief is entirely unjustifiable in its processes.
SAMPLE 2
Samantha McCosh
Reflection Week 2: Goldman
Goldman discusses the idea of justified beliefs and the notions of reliability.
He believes that reliability is what makes a belief justified. Goldman’s views vary
from arguing that facts about reliability are needed in order to gain knowledge, to
the idea that those facts whether justifiable or not are internally available to you.
The externalist about justification rejects the idea about facts being internally
available and instead states that those thoughts can be different than the things you
are justified in believing.
Process reliabilism explains that you do not need to know how your belief
was produced for the belief to be justified, or do you need to provide evidence in
order to prove the reliability. This concept seems extremely controversial in the
mere sense that his original argument states that you must have a reliable
experience or solid facts to prove the validity of what you see or believe (example:
clock on the mantel), then he comes out and says that you shouldn’t question the
“how” aspect of how your belief came to be.
Philosopher Alston stated, in regards to Goldman’s arguments, “to assume its
truth is to commit an epistemological level confusion.” This statement bothers me
in a sense that if you never truly believe anything in life, and continue to question
the validity even after evidence is freely given, when will you find peace of your
mind? I don’t ever want to promote naivety, and I admire anyone who questions
everything but at some point, after all evidence is gathered and signs point to true,
it’s most likely going to be true. And worst case scenario, it turns out being false,
you will only gain knowledge about being better at analyzing evidence, in regards to
the next belief, to discover what’s true or not, valid or invalid, reliable or unreliable.
SAMPLE 3
Cherinity Kistler
September 2, 2013
Phil 101
Principles of Human Knowledge
Berkeley
In this reading Berkeley questions ontology (what exists) with epistemology (what we know). He said that something can only exist only if we can perceive it and that we cannot conceive abstract ideas or things, only particular things put together. Also the secondary qualities such as measurements, time, depth, and even color only depend on the perceiver’s point of view and perception. This would mean that different perceivers could perceive the exact same thing differently. The three kinds of ideas we are able to perceive are those of sensation, thought, and imagination. He explains our thoughts come to us through the spirit. The spirit itself cannot be perceived, but its ideas are. The spirit has the power of understanding which perceives ideas and the power of will which operates with or produces an idea. He also claims that matter, mass and all things physical are only in the perceiver’s mind. In summary I think this is where the question “If a tree falls in a forest and no one is around to hear it, does it make a sound” comes from.
One argument this calls to mind is, if nobody is in a room does the room no longer exist? If there is nobody to perceive the perception of the room therefore it doesn’t exist until someone goes back into the room to perceive it. What happens to the perception during this time? On a larger scale this would mean that nothing outside this world exists. Also if something is undiscovered does this mean it simply just doesn’t exist yet?
Another question I have with this reading is science and math. Science and math are based on constant facts such as mass, matter, measurements, time, numbers, ect. These things could not be fact for everyone if just based on the perceiver’s position or point of view. Therefore, science or math would have no legitimacy in this world.
SAMPLE 4:
PHIL 101 – 1007
Week 15 Reflection
Greene discusses the prospect of combining moral philosophy and moral psychology into a
“naturalized ethics” to better evaluate issues within normative and meta-ethics; while we cannot
“derive moral principles from scientific facts,” it is plausible to use empirical data to better understand
human morality (544). He maintains how cases involving conflicting moral intuitions, yet seemingly
equal moral obligation (the bleeding hiker vs. the charitable donation) may result from the brain's
tendency to be more altruistic to “personal” rather than “impersonal” needs, as observed in a brain-
imaging experiment (545). He then asserts that belief in moral realism is not “an insight into the nature
of moral truth,” but a result of the moral perceptiveness that humans evolved to thrive socially (547).
In saying that moral convictions are derived from “projections of moral attitudes” rather than
“perceptions of moral truth,” Greene argues that there are no objective morals (547). Rather, he implies
that morals could be considered “experiential qualities,” just as conceptions of beauty are (546).
However, it may not be entirely appropriate to compare conceptions of these perceived qualities with
conceptions of morality, as those qualities do not concern such “dire matters” (like life and death and
societal order) while morals do. Thus, it could be argued that moral perceptions are of a different
nature than aesthetic perceptions and not necessarily subjective.
Also, in his discussion of the evolution of humanity's morality he implies that humans' moral
behaviors arose out of a need to thrive in “our intensely social lives” (547). One may derive from his
argument that certain moral guidelines (like those against murder) have survived the test of time,
allowing humanity to progress to where it is now. Greene would argue that these were formulated by
the “efficient cognitive processes” that came from our need to survive socially (547), but the reverse
could be argued also: that murder negatively affects society because there is a universal law against it,
and our “efficient cognitive processes” could be faculties for observing the nature of this law.
SAMPLE 5:
Emily Masek
PHIL 101 – 1007
14 October 2013
Week 8 Reflection
In this reading, Peter van Inwagen describes what is called the “Argument from Evil,” the argument that a God who is omniscient, omnipotent and morally perfect could not exist if evil is present in the world. Van Inwagen, however, objects to this notion, explaining that God could desire to rid the world of evil, but He may nonetheless have reasons for allowing it that “outweigh the desirability of the non-existence of evil” (p. 31). He then argues that God, by allowing humans to have total free will, consequently allows for the possibility of evil to occur through its abuse (p. 34). Finally, he brings up the account of man's fall as described in Genesis and how the events leading up to Jesus Christ were part of God's “plan of reconciliation” and that canceling evil would only frustrate it (p. 35).
Van Inwagen argues that God must allow for a “total” sort of free will, where God gives someone a
choice between x and y but God cannot ensure that he choose either x or y (p. 33). But while van Inwagen argues that this may not interfere with God's omnipotence, he does not mention whether it would interfere with His omniscience (His knowledge of all things). If God knows the future and thus knows exactly what you will choose to do, then in effect He does determine your course of action either by not stopping you or by intervening in some way that we cannot observe, thus implying determinism. Van Inwagen does not want this, so in order to call for total free will van Inwagen must explain why it would be compatible with God's omniscience.
Also, there is one argument that van Inwagen could have used to make a stronger point. While he
explained the importance of knowing “the nature of free will” (p. 33), he could have also explained the
importance of knowing the nature of evil. Just as cold is the absence of heat, evil can be seen as the absence of good; thus, he may have argued that good and evil must coexist in order for either of them to exist at all. Therefore, good would not exist in any form on earth without the presence of evil; or, at the very least, humans would not fully appreciate good things if God had not allowed evil in order for the two to be contrasted, just as one cannot fully make out a light if there is no surrounding darkness.
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