The absurd: Life if absurd because the human mind invariably seeks meaning, value, and order in the world yet the world itself doesn't contain any of them. The absurd is the relationship between these two facts. The entirety of human life consists in a striving for what one can never find, hence, it is absurd.
Kierkegaard:
1. (a) Interpret the following passage from Kierkegaard. How is it relevant to Camus concern?:
An old proverb fetched from the outward and visible world says: "Only the man that works gets the bread." Strangely enough this proverb does not aptly apply in the world to which it expressly belongs. For the outward world is subjected to the law of imperfection, and again and again the experience is repeated that he too who does not work gets the bread, and the he who sleeps gets it more abundantly than the man who works. In the outward world everything is made payable to the bearer, this world is in bondage to the law of indifference, and to him who has the ring, the spirit of the ring is obedient, whether he be Noureddin or Aladdin, and he who has the world's treasure, has it, however he got it. (Philistines, Knights of Infinite Resignation and Knights of Faith)
(b) Come up with at least two examples from your own life that illustrate the law of indifference.
2. Read 2nd & 3rd paragraph (the method) p. 18.
(a) What does it mean to "leap"?
(b) What does it mean to live without appeal?
3. Explain: "That revolt is the certainty of a crushing fate, without the resignation that ought to accompany it." and "The contrary of suicide is the man condemned to death."
P. 19:
(a) What is the relationship between consciousness, revolt, life?
(b) Why isn't suicide a response to the absurd?
4. (a) Explain rejection of metaphysical freedom.
(b) READ p. 29 1st full paragraph (and last sentence of previous paragraph).
(c) Explain the analogy with the mystics.
5. How do we live without appeal to a scale of values?
(a) What is implied by substituting quantity for quality of life?
(b) What are the practical implications of living an ethics of quantity of experience?
READ p. 21 last 2 paragraphs.
(c) Is is merely duration of life or something else that matters for quantity of life?
1. Why does existentialism horrify certain people?
(a) What does Sartre think of people who say things like: "So there remains within me, unused and quite viable, a host of propensities, inclinations, possibilities, that one wouldn't guess from the mere series of things I've done."
(b) How does Sartre think the existentialist attitude motivates people to act?
(c) What does Sartre mean when he says "there's no such thing as a cowardly constitution"?
(d) Why does he think people don't like this idea? Why does he think existentialism represents 'optimistic toughness'?
(e) What are your thoughts?
2. Intersubjectivity (Explain).
3. Objection: You're able to do anything, no matter what.
(a) What does Sartre say you cannot do?
(b) Try to explain the analogy between making a moral choice a painting a picture.
(c) How can moral decisions not be arbitrary even though there are no a priori values or rules?
4. How is it possible to pass judgment?
(a) Explain: "Every man who takes refuge behind the excuse of his passions, every man who sets up a determinism, is a dishonest man."
(b) Why can't people choose dishonesty?
5. How can the existentialist pass moral judgment?
(a) What does Sartre mean "freedom is the basis of all values"?
(b) What do you think of this idea?
(c) How does our own freedom depend entirely on the freedom of others and the freedom of others depend on ours?
(d) When does Sartre morally judge someone to be a coward?
(e) What is the moral standard of action for existentialists?
6. How does Sartre respond to the charge that "values aren't serious, since you choose them"?
(a) What do you think about his response?
7. Sartre says at the end that "even if God did exist, it would change nothing." What do you think he means?
Review 1. What does "existence precedes essence" mean? 2. Why is "man anguish"? 3. What is bad faith/double dealing? Abandonment and Despair 1. Sartre discusses Kierkegaard and the story of Abraham. (a) How does this story relate to subjectivism? (b) How does this story relate to "man is anguish"? Interpretation: http://khamakarpress.com/2016/07/01/rabbi-yisrael-all-palestinians-must-be-killed-men-women-infants-and-beasts/ Killing Deuteronomy 20:10-15 – When you march up to attack a city, make its people an offer of peace. If they accept and open their gates, all the people in it shall be subject to forced labor and shall work for you. If they refuse to make peace and they engage you in battle, lay siege to that city. When the LORD your God delivers it into your hand, put to the sword all the men in it. As for the women, the children, the livestock and everything else in the city, you may take these as plunder for yourselves. And you may use the plunder the LORD your God gives you from your enemies. This is how you are to treat all the cities that are at a distance from you and do not belong to the nations nearby. Don't Ignore the Torah Matthew 5:17-19 – "Do not think that I have come to abolish the Law or the Prophets; I have not come to abolish them but to fulfill them. I tell you the truth, until heaven and earth disappear, not the smallest letter, not the least stroke of a pen, will by any means disappear from the Law until everything is accomplished. Anyone who breaks one of the least of these commandments and teaches others to do the same will be called least in the kingdom of heaven, but whoever practices and teaches these commands will be called great in the kingdom of heaven."
“For truly, I say to you, till heaven and earth pass away, not an iota, not a dot, will pass the law until all is accomplished. Whoever then relaxes one of the least of these commandments and teaches men so, shall be called least in the kingdom of heaven; but he who does them and teaches them shall be called great in the kingdom of heaven.” (Matthew 5:18-19 RSV)
Homosexuality
"If a man lies with a male as with a woman, both of them have committed an abomination; they shall surely be put to death; their blood is upon them." Chapter 20 verse 13
And likewise also the men, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in their lust one toward another; men with men working that which is unseemly, and receiving in themselves that recompense of their error which was meet,”
And even as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do those things which are not convenient; Being filled with all unrighteousness, fornication, wickedness, covetousness, maliciousness; full of envy, murder, debate, deceit, malignity; whisperers, Backbiters, haters of God, despiteful, proud, boasters, inventors of evil things, disobedient to parents, Without understanding, covenant breakers, without natural affection, implacable, unmerciful: Who knowing the judgment of God, that they which commit such things are worthy of death, not only do the same, but have pleasure in them that do them. (Romans 1:27-32)
Second Coming
MAT 24:34 Verily I say unto you, This generation shall not pass, till all these things be fulfilled. MAR 13:30 Verily I say unto you, that this generation shall not pass, till all these things be done. LUK 21:32 Verily I say unto you, This generation shall not pass away, till all be fulfilled.
Judging
1 Cor 2:15 "The spiritual man makes judgments about all things, but he himself is not subject to any man's judgment:" (NIV) 1 Cor 4:5 "Therefore judge nothing before the appointed time; wait till the Lord comes. He will bring to light what is hidden in darkness and will expose the motives of men's hearts. At that time each will receive his praise from God."
Sins of the Father
ISA 14:21 Prepare slaughter for his children for the iniquity of their fathers; that they do not rise, nor possess the land, nor fill the face of the world with cities. DEU 24:16 The fathers shall not be put to death for the children, neither shall the children be put to death for the fathers: every man shall be put to death for his own sin. Adultery Leviticus 20:10 - 'If a man commits adultery with another man's wife—with the wife of his neighbor—both the adulterer and the adulteress must be put to death. Rape Deuteronomy 22:28-29 - "If a man happens to meet a virgin who is not pledged to be married and rapes her and they are discovered, he shall pay the girl's father fifty shekels of silver. He must marry the girl, for he has violated her. He can never divorce her as long as he lives." Women 1 Timothy 2:11-12 – "A woman should learn in quietness and full submission. I do not permit a woman to teach or to have authority over a man; she must be silent." Deuteronomy 25:11-12 – "If two men are fighting and the wife of one of them comes to rescue her husband from his assailant, and she reaches out and seizes him by his private parts, you shall cut off her hand. Show her no pity." The Sabbath Exodus 35:2 – " For six days, work is to be done, but the seventh day shall be your holy day, a Sabbath of rest to the LORD. Whoever does any work on it must be put to death." Homosexuality Leviticus 20:13 – "If a man lies with a man as one lies with a woman, both of them have done what is detestable. They must be put to death; their blood will be on their own heads." Prisoners of War Isaiah 13:15-18 - "Whoever is captured will be thrust through; all who are caught will fall by the sword. Their infants will be dashed to pieces before their eyes; their houses will be looted and their wives ravished. See, I will stir up against them the Medes, who do not care for silver and have no delight in gold. Their bows will strike down the young men; they will have no mercy on infants nor will they look with compassion on children." Non-Believers Deuteronomy 17:2-5 - "If a man or woman living among you in one of the towns the LORD gives you is found doing evil in the eyes of the LORD your God in violation of his covenant, and contrary to my command has worshiped other gods, bowing down to them or to the sun or the moon or the stars of the sky, and this has been brought to your attention, then you must investigate it thoroughly. If it is true and it has been proved that this detestable thing has been done in Israel, take the man or woman who has done this evil deed to your city gate and stone that person to death." Leviticus 24:13-16 - "Then the LORD said to Moses: "Take the blasphemer outside the camp. All those who heard him are to lay their hands on his head, and the entire assembly is to stone him. Say to the Israelites: 'If anyone curses his God, he will be held responsible; anyone who blasphemes the name of the LORD must be put to death. The entire assembly must stone him. Whether an alien or native-born, when he blasphemes the Name, he must be put to death." 2. For Sartre, what does abandonment mean? (a) How is Sartre's atheism different from the old atheism? (b) Famously, Sartre says "man is condemned to be free." What does this mean? 3. (b) The existentialist doesn't believe in the power of passion." (a) What does this mean? (b) Do you agree/disagree? Why? 4. "The existentialist does not think that man is going to help himself by finding in the world some omen by which to orient himself." (Think about the story of Abraham and of the Jesuit priest). (a) What does this mean? (b) How does the story of the Jesuit relate to this point? Think of at 3 three different ways the Jesuit could have interpreted his situation. (c) How does the story of Abraham relate to this point? Suggest other ways Abraham could have interpreted the situation? (d) Do you agree or disagree with Sartre's point? How does Sartre's point also relate to anguish? How are abandonment and anguish connected? (e) Think of some omens that you or other people have used in the past. What would Sartre say about this? 5. What is the point(s) of the story about the young man? (a) How would you choose what to do? Why? What would Sartre say about your choice? (b) Why doesn't Sartre think appealing to an ethical system will answer the young man's question? How does this relate to abandonment? 6. What is Sartre's reply to the suggestion that we go with our feelings to guide important decisions? (a) What role do you think emotions should play in our decision-making? 7. What does Sartre say about turning to others for advice? (a) What are your thoughts on this? 8. What does Sartre mean by "despair". (a) What do the Marxists say about this? (b) How does he reply? (c) What are the implications of despair to our life plans?
"A study published in the International Journal of Business Administration found that what students read in college directly affects the level of writing they achieve. In fact, researchers found that reading content and frequency may exert more significant impacts on students’ writing ability than writing instruction and writing frequency. Students who read academic journals, literary fiction, or general nonfiction wrote with greater syntactic sophistication (more complex sentences) than those who read fiction (mysteries, fantasy, or science fiction) or exclusively web-based aggregators like Reddit, Tumblr, and BuzzFeed. The highest scores went to those who read academic journals; the lowest scores went to those who relied solely on web-based content."
Another study that shows something I've argued for a while now: it's quality, not quantity, that matters when it comes to reading. You can read a ton of books, but that doesn't matter if all the books are crap. Sure, read your schlocky novels and children's books for fun, but read something complex or thought-provoking too. Don't starve your brain. It's hungry. Feed it.
Camus & Kierkegaard: The Existential Situation
1. (a). What is the most important philosophical question one could ask? (Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, p. 3-4)
(b). Discuss Camus' answer. Do you agree or disagree?
2. (a) What does suicide entail? What consequences does it imply?
(b) Read Camus, p. 5.
(c) Discuss Camus's answer.
3. (a) Interpret the following passage from Kierkegaard. How is it relevant to Camus concern?:
An old proverb fetched from the outward and visible world says: "Only the man the works gets the bread." Strangely enough this proverb does not aptly apply in the world to which it expressly belongs. For the outward world is subjected to the law of imperfection, and again and again the experience is repeated that he too who does not work gets the bread, and the he who sleeps gets it more abundantly than the man who works. In the outward world everything is made payable to the bearer, this world is in bondage to the law of indifference, and to him who has the ring, the spirit of the ring is obedient, whether he be Noureddin or Aladdin, and he who has the world's treasure, has it, however he got it. (Philistines, Knights of Infinite Resignation and Knights of Faith)
(b) Come up with at least two examples from your own life that illustrate the law of indifference.
4. (a) For Camus, how do existential thoughts begin? (p. 12)
(b) Camus says "we live on the future". What does he mean? (p. 12)
5. Suppose Camus and Kierkegaard are right. Life is fundamentally absurd, unjust, and without intrinsic meaning. What follows from this?
Sartre Part 1 PDF V.1PDF v. 2 (full) 1. Four Charges against Existentialism A. Desperate quietism. Existentialism offers no concrete answers regarding how to face the world and structure you life. It says that there are no True answers. And so, instead of acting, we merely contemplate--which is a luxury. Thus, existentialism can't be a philosophy for the common person.
B. Dwells on human degradation. Existentialism dwells on all that is wrong with the human condition and ignores the beautiful and positive.
C. Incapable of human solidarity. Because existentialism because from the inescapable subjective point of view of the cogito, it is solopsistic. We cannot know the existence of other points of view and therefore are confined to our own internal world of concerns.
D. Ignores divine commands and man's place in the universe. If God and objective values don't exist then anything goes. There will be no standards according to which we can judge behavior--both our own and that of others.
1. (a) Explain what "existence precedes essence" means (p. 2).
(b) Give 2 examples of essence preceding existence.
(c) Why does Sartre think there is no human nature (p. 2-3)?
2. (a) Explain: "Man is nothing else but what he makes of himself."
(b) In terms of answering the question of the meaning of life, what does existence precedes essence imply?
(c) Is this a good thing or a bad thing or both? Why/Why not?
(d) What is the relationship of existentialism to human dignity?
3. Sartre says "man will be what he will have planned to be, not what he wants to be."
(a) What does this mean? What is the difference between wanting and planning?
(b) Apply this advice to your own life. Think about some of the things you want to be. What would it mean to plan to be these things? How would you go about doing it?
4. Sartre says "man is responsible for what he is" (p. 16, Citatel) or (other translation) "Not that he is simply what he conceives himself to
be, but he is what he wills, and as he conceives himself after already existing – as
he wills to be after that leap towards existence. Man is nothing else but that which
he makes of himself" (p. 3 online).
(a) What does this mean?
(b) Why does he believe this?
(c) Do you agree or disagree with his position? Support your argument.
(d) Are you responsible for what you are?
5. Sartre says that by "man is responsible for what he is" that this doesn't only apply to the individual person but also to all of humanity (Citadel p. 16-17) (p. 4 online) and "To choose to be this or that is to affirm at the same time the value of what we choose, because we can never choose evil." Or (online translation p. 4) Who, then, can prove that I am the proper person to impose, by my own
choice, my conception of man upon mankind? I shall never find any proof
whatever; there will be no sign to convince me of it. If a voice speaks to me, it is
still I myself who must decide whether the voice is or is not that of an angel. If I
regard a certain course of action as good, it is only I who choose to say that it is
good and not bad."
(a) What does he mean?
(b) Do you agree? Support your position.
6. "Man is anguish" (Citadel p. 18, Online v. 2 p. 25)
(a) What does he mean?
(b) Have you experienced anguish in the sense he describes?
(c) Is he right that man is anguish?
7. One charge against existentialism is that because of its subjectivism 'anything goes'. He partially addresses the charge when implicitly references the Kantian standard and refers to bad faith.
(a) What does he mean by bad faith?
(b) How successful is this response?
(c) Defend your position.
8. Sartre discusses Kierkegaard and the story of Abraham (p. 26 v. 2).
(a) How does this story relate to "man is anguish"?
(b) How does this story relate to subjectivism and Descartes first meditation?
(c) Consider the next paragraph on angels and the voice of God. What is Sartre's point here? What is the relationship between possibility, interpretation, subjectivity, and anguish?
9. In the last section on anguish, Sartre speaks about the relationship between anguish, quietism, possibility, and value. (p. 27 v. 2)
(a) Explain the relationship between them.
(b) Why does he not think existential anguish necessarily implies quietism?
(c) What do you think about what he says in this passage?
10. If Sartre is right about the themes in question 8, how do we make our first 'movement'.
(a) How do we decide which of the infinite directions we can take our lives, the millions of possible ways to 'be'? If I'm a student, doctor, engineer, mother, etc... I have a framework from within which to make my choices (Sartre calls this an 'ethic'). However, how do I choose my ethic?
VII
1. (p. 27): Oh, tell me, who was it
first announced, who was it first proclaimed, that man
only does nasty things because he does not know his own
interests; and that if he were enlightened, if his eyes were
opened to his real normal interests, man would at once
cease to do nasty things, would at once become good and
noble because, being enlightened and understanding his
real advantage, he would see his own advantage in the good
and nothing else, and we all know that not one man can,
consciously, act against his own interests, consequently, so
to say, through necessity, he would begin doing good?
(a) Explain the above quote
(b) Why does the Underground Man think the person who holds this view is a pure, innocent child?
(c) i. Is he right? ii. Think of instances in your own life where you knowingly acted against your own interests. How do you explain why you did this?
2. (p. 30): I want to compromise myself personally,
and therefore I boldly declare that all these fine systems,
all these theories for explaining to mankind their real normal
interests, in order that inevitably striving to pursue
these interests they may at once become good and noble—
are, in my opinion, so far, mere logical exercises!
(a) Explain
(b) Do you agree or disagree? Why?
3. (p. 31): The only gain of civilisation for
mankind is the greater capacity for variety of sensations— and absolutely nothing more. And through the development
of this many- sidedness man may come to finding enjoyment
in bloodshed. In fact, this has already happened to
him. Have you noticed that it is the most civilised gentlemen
who have been the subtlest slaughterers, to whom the
Attilas and Stenka Razins could not hold a candle, and if
they are not so conspicuous as the Attilas and Stenka Razins
it is simply because they are so often met with, are so
ordinary and have become so familiar to us. In any case civilisation
has made mankind if not more bloodthirsty, at
least more vilely, more loathsomely bloodthirsty. In old
days he saw justice in bloodshed and with his conscience at
peace exterminated those he thought proper. Now we do
think bloodshed abominable and yet we engage in this
abomination, and with more energy than ever.
(a) i. Explain the passage and ii. how it functions in relation with the quote in question (2).
(b) Do you agree or disagree? Why?
(c) In respect to the last sentence, the author asks "which is worse?". What do you think?
4. (a) What is the Crystal Palace? (p. 32)
5. (p. 33) Man is stupid, you know,
phenomenally stupid; or rather he is not at all stupid, but
he is so ungrateful that you could not find another like him
in all creation.
(a) Explain
(b) Can you think of current events or personal events that would support this view?
(c) If so, what does that say about human nature, technology, ethics, and politics?
VIII Dennett on telling people they don't have free will.
1. (p. 35) Indeed, if there really is some day discovered a
formula for all our desires and caprices—that is, an explanation
of what they depend upon, by what laws they arise,
how they develop, what they are aiming at in one case and
in another and so on, that is a real mathematical formula—then,
most likely, man will at once cease to feel desire,
indeed, he will be certain to. For who would want to choose
by rule? Besides, he will at once be transformed from a human
being into an organ-stop or something of the sort; for
what is a man without desires, without free will and without
choice, if not a stop in an organ? What do you think? Let us
reckon the chances—can such a thing happen or not?
(a) Is Dostoevsky right?
(b) Do you think it would affect people if we told them they had no free will?
2. (p. 35-36) ‘Our choice is usually mistaken from a
false view of our advantage. We sometimes choose absolute nonsense because in our foolishness we see in that nonsense
the easiest means for attaining a supposed advantage. [. . .] For if a desire should come into conflict with reason we
shall then reason and not desire, because it will be impossible
retaining our reason to be SENSELESS in our desires,
and in that way knowingly act against reason and desire
to injure ourselves.
(p. 37) You see,
gentlemen, reason is an excellent thing, there’s no disputing
that, but reason is nothing but reason and satisfies only the
rational side of man’s nature, while will is a manifestation
of the whole life, that is, of the whole human life including
reason and all the impulses. And although our life, in this
manifestation of it, is often worthless, yet it is life and not
simply extracting square roots.
(a) Explain the passages and how the 2nd is a reply to the first.
(b) Are reason and the will at odds?
(c) What do you think the respective roles of reason and the will are regarding giving meaning or value to life?
3. (p. 38) But very often, and even most often, choice
is utterly and stubbornly opposed to reason ... and ... and
... do you know that that, too, is profitable, sometimes even
praiseworthy?
(a) Why is this "stupid" caprice of ours sometimes the "most advantageous advantage"?
(b) Do you agree or disagree? Why?
(c) Sometimes the will and reason align and sometimes they pull apart. How do we decide which to follow?
4. (p. 40-41) (a) What does the history of man show?
(b) What is the "point" he must always make?
(c) What does the narrator say to the reply that science isn't trying to take away his free will, just make it align with reason?
5. (p. 39) There are continually turning up in
life moral and rational persons, sages and lovers of humanity
who make it their object to live all their lives as morally
and rationally as possible, to be, so to speak, a light to their
neighbours simply in order to show them that it is possible
to live morally and rationally in this world. And yet we all
know that those very people sooner or later have been false
to themselves, playing some queer trick, often a most unseemly
one.
(a) Can you come up with contemporary examples?
IX
1. (a) How does the author defend the view that we ought not align our will purely with reason?
(b) Who, that we've covered in our course, do you think he's referring to?
(c) Do you agree/disagree? Why?
(d) Why does the author think man so loves destruction? Explain the disanalogy between man and the ants.
(e) Do you agree/disagree? Why?
2. (p. 43). Man likes to make roads and to create, that is a fact
beyond dispute. But why has he such a passionate love for
destruction and chaos also? Tell me that!
(a) Explain.
(b) Why does the author think "man is a comical creature; there seems to be a kind of jest in it all. "
(c) What are your thoughts? Could you describe aspects of your own life this way?
3. (p. 44) And why are you so firmly, so triumphantly, convinced
that only the normal and the positive—in other words, only
what is conducive to welfare—is for the advantage of man?
(a) What else does the author think man values?
(b) Do you agree/disagree?
4. What does the author think gives life value that is not taken into account by science and reason?
How do you think actions come about? The common sense (and our experience) explanation is we (1) make a conscious decision to do something (2) our brain activates whatever neuro-pathways are required for the action, the (3) we perform the action. Libet's famous experiments give strong evidence showing that this is NOT the order of how our actions come about.
For many people, the famous Libet experiments show that we don't have free will. Free will is only an illusion. Our brains have already decided what we're going to do, then, after the fact, we only have the experience of deciding what we'll do. Watch the video yourself and think about what the experiment shows.
In case it wasn't clear from the video, here's how the experiment goes: The subject observes a timer thingy (the type of timer varies from experiment to experiment). The subject is asked to raise their finger whenever they want. By looking at the clock, they are also supposed to note the time at which they first became aware of their (conscious) desire to move their finger. The subject is also wired up to an EEG (electroencephalography) sensor which measures the electrical potentials around the scalp coming from the part of the brain responsible for motor activity. There's also an EMG (electromyography) sensor that measures the exact time the finger moves.
The results of the experiment show that there is a ramping up of brain activity .550 seconds before the subject's consciously aware of their decision or desire to move their finger. This "ramping up" activity is called readiness potential (RP). So, the order of events is (1) RP, (2) conscious willing to move the finger, (3) finger movement. In theory, because readiness potential happens before conscious awareness of a decision, Libet can know that we are going to move our finger before our own conscious awareness of our decision to do so! Mind=blown.
Wegner's Interpretation
Libet's experiments seem to give compelling evidence in favour of determinism. Our conscious experience of choice is an illusion. Our body's physical systems have already "decided" what to do and our consciousness of what we will do occurs only after this happens. Our conscious selves are merely along for the ride. "Voluntary" actions don't go: (t1) "hmmm...I'm going to move finger now", (t2) *finger moves*. They go like this (t1) brain initiates preparations for moving the finger (t2) meta-brain says "I decide to move my finger" (t3) *finger moves*.
From these experiments it doesn't seem like we consciously will our actions. Our dictator brain has already begun preparations for what you will do before you are even conscious of it. Our conscious selves just think they're making a decision. Curse you, evil brain! I want to be free!
Libet's Interpretation
Libet's own interpretation was different. He thought that rather than free will, we had "free won't". He thought, yes, the brain initiates urges and intentions but we have a window (about .1-.2 seconds) to consciously override the brain's urge.
To test his hypothesis he set up the following experiment. He set things up similar to the original experiment but this time he told the subjects to plan to move their finger at a set time on the timer and then to "veto" the intention to move their finger.
Results: RP started about 1 second (vs .550 sec. in the original version) before the set time. Then at about .1-.2 seconds before the subject was to move their finger RP flattened out.
Interpretation: The brain generated the unconscious desire to move the finger but when this desire entered into consciousness "free won't" was able to veto the urge. In other words, our desires and intentions are generated unconsciously but when they enter consciousness we have the ability to over-ride them. Problem: What if the process that generated the 'free won't' is also unconscious? Doh!
Mele's Interpretation
Alfred Mele be like, "whatchu talkin' 'bout Willis? That ain't no proof of determinism!" Poor Libet. He doesn't have a philosopher's training and therefore blurs some important distinctions. In Libet's interpretation of the results, he uses the words "intention," "decision," "wish," and "urge" interchangeably. Unfortunately for Libet, he never had the good fortune of taking philosophy 101 at UNLV where he would have learned that you can't just go around willy-nilly using words without first specifying what they mean. Let's look at some of the important distinctions and see how they apply to interpreting Libet's experiments.
Wanting/Urges to vs Intending/Deciding to
You can want to do A without having settled that you are actually going to do A. I want to live on a ranch with a herd of wiener dogs but I don't intend to do it (right now, anyway). I can want to eat all the donuts in the bakery but still do not form the intention to do so...
We can further see the distinction when we have competing wants. I want to finish my grading by 9pm but I also want to finish writing my lecture by 9 pm. I can't do both. The one that I end up doing is the one for which I formed an intention. When you make up your mind about a course of actionbetween competing wants then you can say you intend to do it. In short, wanting to A is simply having the desire to A. Intending to A requires making a decision to A.
Distal vs Proximal Intentions
We can also distinguish between distal and proximal intentions. A proximal intention is when I intend to do something that is temporally close. A distal intention is when I intend to do something in the more distant future. For example, on Saturday I intend to take my dogs for a hike.
Ok, back to Libet. Libet says that the process that produces the urge to move the finger (the 'act now' process) is occurring before conscious awareness to decide to move the finger. This process begins at around 550 msec before the finger moves. Also, the urge that initiates the 'act now' process creates a proximal intention to flex the finger. So far, we can agree with Libet that the "'act now' process is initiated unconsciously, "[...] conscious free will is not doing it"; i.e. conscious free will is not initiating the 'act now' process.
However, why should we suppose that the role of conscious free will is to produce urges or causally contributes to urges? Typically, free will is thought to apply to situations where the agent is deliberating between between possible courses of action or whether they should or should not act. Free will is not thought to have the role of producing urges, rather, it is about choosing.
Processes Have Parts
Free will doesn't create the urge. The origins of the urge are unconscious. However, the process that begins with an unconscious urge can give rise to a conscious intention to act or not act in accordance with the urge. The conscious intention is temporally closer to the final act (move finger) and so it seems as though it is the conscious intention rather than the unconscious urge that is causally responsible for the act.
Issue: What is the relationship between temporal distance and causal power?
Other Objections/Issues to Deterministic Interpretation of Libet Experiments Issue: Do these results generalize? Lab conditions vs Real life. Do the results generalize to all types of decisions/intentions? Objection: Of Course There's Prior Brain Activity!
If brain events underlie mental events then we shouldn't be surprised that there is brain activity prior to a conscious decision. Why should we suppose that the production of conscious decisions doesn't involve prior brain activity to lead up to the brain state that is a conscious mental state? Having no brain activity prior to a conscious decision would be the surprising finding. Not that there is prior brain activity.
Objection: The Meta-State
Consider that you've been reading this post for the last minute or so. The entire time that you were reading or watching the video were you actively conscious of the fact that you were reading or watching the video? Or were you simply reading and watching without the awareness "I'm reading/watching".
The argument here is that the Libet experiment measures an awareness of a conscious state; i.e., a meta-consciousness. Most activities that we do, we aren't actively aware of. When we drive, read, walk, etc...often doing so isn't part of our immediate conscious awareness, yet no one could seriously say that we aren't conscious when we do these things. Only when something draws our attention to our activity do we become aware of what we are doing; this is the meta-conscious state. It's having the awareness "oh, I'm doing X now" rather than the state of 'just' doing X.
The Libet experiments measure the meta-conscious state about a prior awareness of our decision to move our finger, not the immediate state of awareness that we want to move our finger. The time delay between the primary state and the meta-state is what accounts for the effect.
Further Studies that Might Prove Determinism True:
In further studies using an fMRI machine, scientists in lab coats have been able to predict a subject's decision of up to 7 SECS before the subject's own awareness of what she will choose. Ho. Lee. Crap. If this doesn't sound like evidence against free will, I don't know what is!
Objection 1: The Media Isn't Reporting the Whole Story and Is Sensationalizing (Surprise!)
What the data actually shows is that the scientist can predict your decision to move your finger at a rate 7% better than chance. If you were to make predictions blind, over the long run, you'd be right about 50% of the time. The fMRI data allows you to get it right around 57-58% of the time.
Reply: Yes, but 7-8% above chance is still a significant result. If you were given these odds in a casino, you'd be a fool not to take them.
Counter Reply: True dat. However, this result may be a consequence of how the experiment was set up. If subjects were incentivized to try to fool the experimenters, this predictive power might disappear. (If you have an fMRI machine, please do this study!)
Further Study: There may be newer studies that use better equipment and more sophisticated models that have better predictive power. There doesn't seem to be any a priori reason to suppose in the future 100% predictive power couldn't be achieved.
Preferences Vs Free Will
Suppose you frequently go out to dinner with someone you know very well. You've eaten with them many times. You know what their preferences are. You go to a new restaurant and, based on what you know about them, you successfully predict they will order the T-bone steak. Does the fact that we can accurately predict someone's actions tell us anything about free will?
The Mechanistic Brain Vs Free Will (Adina Roskies)
So maybe being able to predict someone's behaviour--be it from fMRI scans or from preferences--isn't sufficient to imply we don't have free will. Do these studies provide evidence for any other challenges to free will?
One thing these (and subsequent) studies make clear is that the brain is mechanistic. We can identify which parts of the brain and which neurons are responsible for certain actions and behaviours. In short, the brain behaves in mechanistic law-like ways. So, the difficulty is to explain how we get free will out of a mechanistic law-like system. Consider a computer. It performs its functions in mechanistic law-like ways, yet we don't attribute to it free will. How are we different? Are we really all like 2Chainz showin' up to the scene with our top down? Is it cuz we're made of meat rather than metal and silicon? What's so special about meat?
The underlying worry is that because we are meat-based mechanisms we don't have free will. But Adina Roskies suggests maybe this conclusion needn't follow. If we suppose that having a mind is necessary for free will then maybe having a better understanding of the brain's mechanism gives us a better understanding of mind.
For example, most theories of free will tell us that certain mental capacities are required for free will: the capacity for rational deliberation, the capacity to assign moral value to certain outcomes, the capacity to put judgments into action. So, while at first blush it may seem that neuroscience undermines free will, in fact it doesn't, it gives us a better understanding of the brain mechanisms, functions, and states that underlie the mental capacities that are integral to free agency. This type of study can inform us of things that can happen to the brain that can impede capacities for free agency.
An often cited example in the literature is a patient that led a perfectly normal life up to a point when he started to have pedophilic urges and eventually couldn't control himself. When he was sentenced to jail, he complained of a headache. When they scanned his brain they found a large tumor. When they removed the tumor his urges completely went away.
Later he started to feel the urges again and when they scanned his brain, they found a tumor in the same place. Once the tumor was removed, the urges disappeared again. This is fairly strong evidence for a causal relationship between the tumor interfering with normal brain activity and the ability to exercise one's will.
Epiphenominalism: The Role of Consciousness in Decision-Making
Epiphenominalism is the idea that our conscious experiences don't play any causal role. They just "ride on top" of whatever our brains are doing. They're superfluous. We encountered this idea earlier with Chalmers' Zombies, and blind-sight.
So, if our brains are causing us to act before we have any conscious awareness of what we're going to do, then why should we think that consciousness plays a role in decision-making? First of all, it looks like there are at least some areas where consciousness does play a causal role. Conscious experiences (memories) can inform decisions even if those decisions proceed unconsciously.
For example, my memory of the line for the salad bar being really slow causes me to choose something else like subway for lunch. The decision might be unconscious, but a conscious state plays a causal role in the decision.
Maybe Libet's results support limited epiphenominalism about decision-making. Consciousness doesn't cause the decision but it doesn't make consciousness irrelevant. My conscious experiences figure into my unconscious decisions. But the decision isn't caused by consciousness.
Should non-determinists be worried?
From a neuro-science point of view, Libet's findings make sense. The decision-making system does its job first, then the conscious monitoring system does its job. Of course the decision has to come first, otherwise there'd be nothing for the conscious monitoring system to monitor!
Possible Compatibilist interpretation: The urges/wants I have are going to be a consequence of my values and preferences. In that sense, they represent what "I" want rather than being totally random.
Method of Submission: As an attachment to my gmail address (so I can make comments in google doc) General tips for writing
What should be in the outline? A. Your tentative first paragraph (say what you're going to say)
1. Issue: What is the main issue your paper is about and why is it important.
2. Thesis: What position are you going to take on the issue and why? (E.g., I'm going to argue that Ami is like Jesus because he wears sandals and says wise things.)
3. Road map: What will be the main sections of your paper? (E.g., First, I'm going to give an overview of the issue and position X; second I'm going to explain and evaluate the first argument; third, I'm going to explain and evaluate the second argument; fourth, I'm going to give my own argument; finally, I will conclude that, based on the evaluations of the available arguments, X is not a very plausible solution to/explanation of the issue, instead we ought adopt an approach more like Y.
B. Exposition (say it)
You can do this two possible ways. One is to write this section in terms of the position you'll be defending, the other is to focus on explaining the position you'll be arguing against. Either way is fine. About a page to a page and a half should be dedicated to explaining precisely what the main issue is and what the points of debate are (i.e., sub-issues). You don't need to give the particular arguments for/against a position in detailed form but once you've outlined the contested sub-issues, you should, in a sentence, state what the main positions are on that sub-issue. In this section you should also make clear any technical terms.
For your outline, in point form identify and explain any important technical terms and the main points of debate within the issue (that you'll be addressing in your paper).
C1. Arguments and Dialectic (say it)
Now it's time to get fine-grained.
1. In point form, state the main premises of the argument you'll be evaluating.
2. In point form, state the main objection(s) to this argument.
3 In point form, state what position you'll eventually side with and why (in terms of whether the objections are successful or fail.
Repeat steps 1-3 for each main argument you'll be evaluating in your paper.
C2. Optional (say it)
Depending on how you structure your paper, your own input might be in the form of (a) analysis or original reply/counter-argument within the context of the dialectic in C1 and/or (b) adding an innovation to or strengthening an existing argument or response. However, you may also, if you so choose, introduce your own original line of argument into the issue. If you choose to do this, you should follow this structure:
1. Introduce your own line of argument for/against the main position.
2. Explain why your argument is relevant to the debate.
3. Consider objections to your argument.
4. Show why those objections don't, on balance, defeat your argument.
D. Conclusion (say what you said) *Not required for the outline*
1. Resummarize the main issue and the position you were arguing for/against.
2. Resummarize the main reasons for which position X should be accepted or rejected (i.e., your conclusions from C1 and C2).
3. (Optional) Suggest how you conclusion might have implications for other issues.
Here are some possible topics for papers. You aren't obligated to use these, you can come up with your own if you like, so long as you check with me first. Also, if you have a specific area of interest (e.g., your career, your major) that might be content for a paper, let me know and I'll help you find a way to write a philosophy paper about it. The best papers are the ones that are about something you're interested in and since philosophy applies to just about everything, there's a good chance we can find a way to turn one of your interests into a paper. Topic 1: Kant vs Mill in Applied Ethics
You are a surgeon in the emergency burn unit. A patient comes in with burns on 90% of their body. The only way to save them is to amputate all four limbs. The patient is unconscious so you can't know what they'd want and they have no next of kin to make the decision. You must make a decision immediately or the patient will die. What is the right thing to do and why? (a) Briefly outline both Kantian and Utilitarian ethics. (b) For each, what makes an action 'right'? (c) Apply each theory to the case--what does each say you should do and why? (Be sure to distinguish between act and rule utilitarianism). (d) Which decision do you agree with and why? (e) How might the opposing view reply? (f) How might you counter-reply?
Topic 2: Standards of Rightness
Kant thinks what makes an action right is the motive behind it because we can't be responsible for whether things actually end up having good or bad consequences. Mill thinks an action is right in so far as it produces the greatest net good relative to other possible actions and that the motive of the action is irrelevant to its goodness; the motive only tells us about the moral worth of the agent. (a) Explain both views regarding what we morally ought to do and why; (b) who's right about what is right? Support your position with arguments and cases that pull our intuitions.
Topic 3: Kant and Mill in Applied Ethics
In using both the injured hiker and drowning child case, Peter Singer argues, via analogy, that we are morally obligated to help others in so far as we are able. (a) outline the argument, (b) if you agree, show how possible objections fail OR if you disagree show how possible objections succeed.
Topic 4: Meta-Ethics: Moral Realism vs Moral Anti-Realism
Mackie makes two main arguments against moral realism: the argument from relativity (aka disagreement) and the argument(s) from queerness. Smith responds to both arguments. (a) Outline one or both of Mackie's arguments. (b) Explain Smith's response. (c) Does his response succeed? Why or why not? (d) (optional) provide your own arguments in favor of or against one of the two positions.
Topic 5: Free will vs Determinism Regarding Moral Responsibility
Is moral responsibility possible? Under what conditions? Is it just to punish people for their actions? Consider the case of brain tumors and their effect on behavior. Is he blameworthy? If so, in what respects? If not, why not? What are the implications for future discoveries about the relationship between neurology, moral responsibility, blame, and punishment? What would Strawson say and why? What would Frankfurt say and why? Who's right and why? Use both arguments and cases to support your position.
Topic 6: Why Be Moral?
Glaucon and Adeimantus give several arguments against the intrinsic value of being moral. [E.g., 1. Being just is a compromise between acting on all our desires--the greatest good--and having others do what they want to us (the greatest bad); 2. The ring of Gyges shows that we only act morally for instrumental reasons because if we were invisible we'd do things we don't do now; 3. If we imagine the most unjust person but he is perceived as being the most just and the most just persons yet he is perceived as being the most unjust, we will all say that the former had a better life. Pick either one or two of the arguments, carefully explain then evaluate them. Does it succeed in justifying its conclusion? Why or why not? What are some objections? How can Glaucon and Adeimantus reply to the objections? How can you counter-reply? Do we have non-instrumental reasons
Topic 7: The Good Person or the Right Action?
James and Jessica, are training to be nurses. James has wanted to be a nurse for as long as he can remember. He has always wanted to help others and it gives him deep satisfaction to connect emotionally with and care for those who are in pain or discomfort. Jessica looked at various career options and decided on nursing because it seemed like there were good employment prospects, the possibility of a high salary if she specializes later on in her career, and she would be well-suited to it due to her aptitude for science. She prides herself on her ability to detach herself emotionally from her work, perform her duties and follow procedures to the letter. In their coursework and their clinical training, both perform equally well on all tasks assigned to them. Both have applied for the same nursing job at Kalamazoo General Hospital. Which of them should be hired?
What would a virtue ethicist say and why? What would a Kantian say and why? Which theory do you agree with and why?
Note: In answering this question, you need to describe in detail what each moral theory consists of, what it says about objective moral standards and why, and why one of its proponents would take the view that you think they would on this case. In deciding which of the theories you agree with most, you need to compare the arguments for and against each of the theories and attempt to show why one theory is preferable to the others.
Topic 8: Disposal of the Dead (adapted from a Fall 2011 Regional Ethics Bowl case)
The Briggs family is confronted by the choices involved with burial when beloved Grandpa Joe passes away. Joe left three children, now adults, who each have two children of their own. Joe has appointed his eldest daughter, Judith, as executor of his estate. Grandpa Joe was a traditional man with a modest life insurance policy and moderate estate. His wife, Ellen, died several years ago and opted for cremation. But, in conversation he had made it clear that he wanted to be buried in a local plot where several of his ancestors had been buried. In fact, once Joe had mentioned that he wanted a fine mahogany metal-lined casket, a large marble gravestone, and to be buried with a few of his cherished baseball cards and other prized valuables. He became very agitated about it at the time, and to calm him, Judith said that she would do as he wished. While Judith loves Grandpa Joe, she is also a pragmatic woman and isn’t sure that the requests of the dead should come first. Comparing the costs, she notes that a fairly simple cremation costs around $1500, whereas the kind of burial Grandpa Joe has requested would cost around $10,000. As she works on his estate, she notices that Grandpa Joe had not included any instructions in his last will and testament to govern his burial. He did state that any of his remaining financial resources should be divided equally among the three siblings. None of the siblings is very well-off and could all use a few thousand extra dollars. After meeting with family it becomes clear to Judith that her siblings would be comfortable with whatever arrangements she makes and have left the decision in her hands. Judith will meet with the funeral director soon, but is still contemplating what she should do for dear Grandpa Joe. What should she do?
What would a Kantian say? What would an Act Utilitarian say? What would a Rule Utilitarian say? Which theory do you agree with and why?
Note: In answering this question, you need to describe in detail what each moral theory consists of, what it says about objective moral standards and why, and why one of its proponents would take the view that you think they would on this case. In deciding which of the theories you agree with most, you need to compare the arguments for and against each of the theories and attempt to show why one theory is preferable to the others.
Explain background: Play part 1 of blame from 12:30 or 17.
What if the brain abnormality we a consequence of genetics or environment? Would our judgment be the same? Does it matter? Introduction and Context Up until now we've looked at a quick overview of the free will vs causal determinism debate. Aside from the two basic positions--causal determinism and libertarian free will, there are two other "meta-positions": compatibilism and incompatibilism which are basically attitudes toward the debate. Incompatibilists say that causal determinism and free will are mutually exclusive: only one can be true. Compatibilists say that free will and causal determinism are not mutually exclusive: Free will just means that the agent, rather than some external entity, was the causal origin of an action--For example, a free action can be free even if it was causally determined by the agent's genetics or atomic make-up, or whatever. In other words, for compatibilists, a free action is one that wasn't caused by constraints or forces external to the agent. We've also looked at a third position--Strawson's Basic Argument--in which he argues that we are not morally responsible for our actions regardless of whether determinism is true or not. In order to be morally responsible we would have to be responsible for the type of person that we are, but in order to choose the type of person that you are you'd also have to choose the set of preferences that lead you to choose to be the type of person that you are. This regress goes back infinitely and so, moral responsibility is impossible. In this next piece Frankfurt argues for a different compatibilist position from the traditional one. He says that mere absence of constraints or external causes isn't sufficient for free will. What is needed for free will is for the agent to have desires about which desire motivates their action--this is what he calls second-order volitions. He takes the following approach to formulate his position: (a) identify what distinguishes a "person" from an animal or non-person, (b) suggest that that quality is free will, (c) show why his conception of free will is superior to others, (d) explain how his notion of free will relates to moral responsibility. Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person What Makes a Person Different from an Animal? The first step is to figure out what trait it is that we implicitly refer to when we identify someone as a person. One way to do this is to compare the qualities we imply by "person" to those we imply by "animal." Often we use the word "person" to mean the singular form of "people". On this interpretation we are simply using the terms to distinguish members of our own species from other species. However, there is another way to use "person." By "person" we also mean the quality or cluster of properties that distinguish us from animals. For Frankfurt, this is, "the structure of a person's will." What is "the structure of a person's will"? To figure this out, let's first look at animals. Animals can act on their desires. Maybe they desire some sort of food or even have some higher level desire like the desire to be part of a group. So, merely having desires can't be what distinguishes persons from animals. What distinguishes our will from an animal will is the type of desires we can have; specifically, second-order desires. Having second order desires means we can desire to desire things. For example, maybe I'm not a very friendly person because I don't desire to be friendly. On the other hand, I realize that this isn't a very good thing, so, I can want to want to be friendlier. This type of second order desiring is pretty typical. It often happens with food... We can also desire not to desire things. For example, maybe I like ice cream just a little bit too much. I wish I didn't. I can desire that I don't want ice cream so much. ("I wish I didn't want ice cream so much" or "I wish I wanted salad more that hamburgers"). The bottom line about second-order desires is that we can reflect on our current set of desires, evaluate them, and form second-level desires about those desires. Animals can't do this. They only have 1st-level desires. What makes a person different from an animal, in the sense that Frankfurt is talking about, is that a person can have second-order desires. To better understand second-order desires about someone else's 1st-order desires, you should listen to this song:
The Will for 1st Order Desires There are two ways to interpret desire statements (A wants X) as they relate to first-order desires. In the first case when I say "I want to eat tofu" this can mean that I want to eat tofu but I also have a collection of various other desires about what I want to eat for dinner, and wanting to eat tofu is only one of them (maybe I want to ice cream and cake for dinner as well or instead of tofu). Maybe, the ice cream and cake win out. It doesn't mean I didn't have the desire to eat tofu. It just wasn't as strong as the other competing desires. Basically, at any given time we can have a whole bunch of desires about what we want. Some of them may be mutually exclusive or some may be complimentary or some may have nothing to do with the others. On the other hand, when I say "I want to eat one more Dorito" this can mean that my desire to eat the Dorito is the motivating force for my consequent action: it is evidence of my "will". So, on this interpretation of "I desire X," the desire of X is the thing that causes me to act. When someone asks me "why did you eat the Dorito," I answer "because I wanted to." The will is the first-order desire that "wins" the motivational competition with the other competing desires and causes you to act. When people talk of the will, this is usually what they mean--but this is not what Frankfurt means by freedom of will. Plain Second Order Desires Vs Second-Order Volitions Frankfurt makes a distinction between two types of 2nd-order desires: one that illustrates freedom of the will and one that doesn't. In the first case we have a desire about which of our 1st-order desires will cause us to act. In the second, we want to have the experience of having a particular 1st-order desire, but we don't want to actually act on that first order desire. If you're confused like me the first time I read this, let's look at some examples to help make sense of this: Let's look at the latter first. To illustrate what Frankfurt means by a 2nd-order desire that doesn't identify what he means by free will, he uses the following example: Suppose a doctor that works with heroin addicts believes that he'd be better able to help his patients if he knew what it was like to desire heroin. Presumably, he'll be better able to help his patients if he understands what their addiction feels like. He has a desire to have a first-order desire. Now, just because he desires to know what it's like to want to take the drug, it doesn't follow that he actually wants (1st order) to take the drug. He just wants to know what it's like to want heroin! Taking heroin wouldn't satisfy the desire he has because his is only a 2nd order desire, not a first order desire (confused yet?). He has no first- order desire to take the illicit drug. If you put heroin in front of him, he'd decline because he doesn't want heroin, he only wants to know what it's like to want heroin (to have the 1st-order desire). He has no desire to actually be motivated to action by the 1st-order desire. The previous account isn't the type of second-order desire that Frankfurt has in mind when he talks about the will. Second-order desires that describes the will are ones where an agent desires to have a first order motivating desire that they either don't currently have or that isn't presently sufficiently strong to motivate action. Consider a tofu example. "I want to eat tofu" is in my (1st-order) set of desires concerning what I want to eat for dinner--but it's not the only one. I also want to eat cake and ice cream. The different desires don't all have the same strength. Only the one that eventually moves me to act is my first-order motivating desire (i.e., my first-order will). I can have a second-order desire about which of my multiple dinner desires will eventually win (i.e., motivate me to act). If it were up to me to program what 1st-order dinner desires I have and the relative strength of each, I'd make it so I really really want to eat tofu--much more than ice cream and cake. I want for my desire to eat tofu for dinner to be the one that wins the motivating battle with the other desires. This is what Frankfurt refers to as a second-order volition (as opposed to a plain 2nd-order desire). A second-order volition is a second-order desire that a particular first-order desire motivate you to act. A second-order volition is saying "I want this first-order desire to be the one that causes me to act rather than some other one." Frankfurt also equates second-order volitions with the type of will that persons have (not to be confused with undeliberated 1st-order wills that animals also have). Wanton vs Person: The Essence of Person Isn't Reason but Will Beginning with Plato and Aristotle (and possibly earlier), the classic demarcation between persons and non-persons (i.e., animals) has been rationality. Frankfurt wants to show that this criterion falls short. To illustrate his point he distinguishes between wantons (someone with no 2nd-order volitions) and persons (someone with 2nd-order volitions). A wonton is a type of dumpling commonly found in a number of Chinese cuisines. They can be filled with different types of meat and can be steamed or cooked in soup. They are often confused for persons which are also filled with meat but should not be steamed or cooked in soup. Don't confuse the two. Frankfurt makes a further distinction. A wanton is someone who is controlled by their 1st-order desires. They make no attempt to exercise their (second-order) will. They may have second-order desires about their first-order desires but they have no second-order volitions. They make no attempt to change what their first-order desires are or their relative strengths. They don't take into account whether the 1st order desires are "desirable" or whether their relative motivating strengths are desirable. However, this is not to say that wantons are irrational agents. They can reason about how they will carry out their desires and what will be the best way to do it; i.e., they have "practical reason". They can also have competing 1st-order desires (I want to eat the chocolate bar vs I don't want to eat the chocolate bar) but they have no second-order desire about which of the two 1st order desires they want to win. They do not reflect or deliberate on which 1st-order desire might be preferable. Wantons can be distinguished from persons not by the capacity to reason but by the (lack of) exercise of second-order volition. A person might have the same set of competing 1st-order desires as a wonton. The person both wants and doesn't want to eat the chocolate bar. The difference between the person and the wanton is that the person wants the "don't-eat-the-chocolate-bar" desire to win (i.e., to motivate action). She can and does reflect and deliberate on which 1st-order desire might be best to have. The preferred 1st-order desire might not win in the end, but the fact that the person has the second order desire about which one wins is all that matters for being a person--not rationality which the wonton also posses. Persons, Second-Order Volitions, and Freedom of Will Consider the person (not the wonton) who has two conflicting first-order desires: to eat the chocolate bar and go to the gym. He has the second order-volition to have the go-to-the-gym desire motivate his action. If this desire motivates his behavior; that is, if he goes to the gym instead of eating the chocolate bar, then we can say that he was exercising his will and acting according to his will. If he ends up eating the chocolate bar, then we say he acted against his own will. What he really wanted was to be motivated to go to the gym. However, for whatever reason--brain chemistry, conditioning--it didn't work out that way. We can say, when he eats the chocolate bar that, "the force moving [the person] is a force other than his own, and it is not of his own free will but rather against his will that this force moves him to eat." Freedom of Will Vs Absence of Constraints (Classical Compatibilism) Classical compatibilism defines free action as any agent's actions that were not coerced or constrained or caused by elements external to the agent. Frankfurt says there's a distinction between freedom of will and acting free from constraints. Consider that animals are free to do as they please. Shoot, my dog still pees in my house if it's rainy or too cold outside--even though I'm sure he knows he's not supposed to. But just because animals can pee wherever they please and are not being coerced into where they pee, we don't typically say they have freedom of will. To further bring out the distinction we observe that it's possible to prevent someone from doing whatever they please without undermining their freedom of will. A prisoner may not be able to act in certain ways but they can still control which desires they do or do not want to have and which ones they do and do not want to try to act on. Freedom of will is when there is alignment of our second-order desire about our first-order desires with the first order desire that actually ends up motivating our actions. In short, it's when the desire that we want to motivate our action ends up being the one that motivates our action. A person can be free from external constraints to do what they want yet not have freedom of will if they fail to have any desires regarding which 1st-order desires motivate their action. Conversely, someone could have freedom of will but not be free from external constraints. "Complexities" that Can Lead to the Destruction of Persons If the whole desiring desires thing wasn't complex enough for you, here are a couple of possible extra-complex problems: A. Conflict of Second-Order Desires: It could happen that I'm conflicted over which of my first order desires I want to motivate me to action. In such a case, I'd have a conflict between second-order desires about my first-order desires. If this happens, you cease to become a person because you have no clear second-order desire with which your first-order desires can conform. You've lost your freedom of will. B. Infinite Regress Problem: Suppose your second-order desires conflict, then you may have volitions or desires about which second-order desires you'd like to win. But what if your tertiary-order desires also conflict about which second-order desires you'd have? This could, in theory, go on infinitely. If this is the case, then your personhood is also destroyed because your freedom of will is lost. There's no correspondence between the higher-order desires ('cuz you haven't decided on one yet) and the first-order desire that motivates action. Partial Solution to B: Just because the regress is possible doesn't mean it will necessarily happen. It may happen. But it may not. Anytime a decision is made between competing higher-order desires about lower-order desires, the regress stops. For example, suppose I am asked if I want to want to eat the chocolate bar. If I indeed do want to want to eat it, then the regress stops. The question "do you want to want to want to eat the chocolate bar?" has already been answered the moment I make a decision concerning the 2nd-order desire to want to eat the chocolate bar. The regress only begins in cases where I don't or can't make a decision either way. What Frankfurt's Theory Explains: Why Freedom of Will is Desirable: Unlike many other theories of free will, Frankfurt's theory explains why freedom of the will is desirable. Freedom of the will allows for the satisfaction of 2nd-order desires. Its absence means those desires are frustrated. Why We Don't Typically Ascribe Free Will to Animals: Another thing Frankfurt's theory explains is why we don't typically ascribe free will to animals. Other theories of free will describe as miraculous the fact that, even though we are physical systems, we are able to break the causal chain. We can seemingly move our limbs at will. But so can animals! We don't consider the fact that animals can move their limbs at their leisure evidence of free will. The Relationship between Free Will and Moral Responsibility
As we've seen, contra classical compatibilists, it doesn't seem to follow from the mere absence of external constraints that an agent has freedom of the will. And if we say that freedom of the will is required for moral responsibility, it follows that absence of physical constraints on a agent isn't sufficient for moral responsibility.
It also doesn't seem to make sense to talk about free will and moral responsibility from the point of view of 1st-order desires. We don't choose our own original set of 1st-order desires. Some of us like eating ho-hos and sitting on the couch, some of us don't. Some of us like to exercise, some of us don't. It doesn't make sense to praise the person who goes to the gym because their pre-existing 1st-order desire to go to the gym is pre-set to be stronger than their first-order desire to sit on the couch eat ho-hos. This person just happened to have lucked out.
Moral praise or blame comes into the picture because as persons we are able to have second-order desires about which of our first-order desires "win". Maybe my disposition is to sit on the couch and eat ho-hos rather than go to the gym. But I have the capacity to deliberate on this fact and will that, despite this, my desire to go to the gym be the one that motivates me. This capacity to reflect on, deliberate, and desire that our pre-existing 1st-order desires be otherwise or be ordered otherwise is what gives rise to moral responsibility. KEY DISTINCTION: Moral responsibility vs free will. For Frankfurt we are morally responsible only for those actions where my will (first order desire) is effective (i.e., is the one that causes me to act) because it is the one that I had a 2nd order desire about. In the case of the reluctant drug addict who doesn't want to want heroin yet ends up succumbing (for physiological/environmental reasons), he isn't morally responsible for his action. He isn't morally responsible because the 1st order desire that ended up motivating his action wasn't the one that he wanted to motivate his action. You are only morally responsible for effective actions that are the result of second order desires with which you identify (i.e., they are your 'true self') Contrast this with having free will (on Frankfurt's view). Having a free will means having the capacity to actually change which of your first order desires is effective. For example, suppose I have the first order desire to eat donuts for breakfast. I could desire not to want donuts and want eggs instead. However, I don't do this even though I could have. In such a case I have free will. Notice that in the case of the unwilling heroin addict, they didn't have the ability to change which would ultimately be the effective (first order) desire. There were physiological and psychological reasons that made it impossible, despite their second order desire not to want to want heroin. They wished they didn't want heroin but other factors made it impossible for "not wanting heroin" to be the effective 1st order desire. Strangely, Frankfurt is neutral regarding moral responsibility in cases where we were able to will otherwise but didn't; i.e., in cases where we have free will yet choose not to exercise it. He doesn't commit to a position regarding whether such a person is morally responsible for their action.
Determinism:
It might be causally determined that we desire what we desire; that is, we might be causally determined to have the 2nd-order desires we have. Frankfurt doesn't think this is a problem. Freedom of the will is simply the exercise of 2nd-order desires. Their causal origins don't matter. If you have freedom of the will, you are also morally responsible for your actions.
Objections: Can we really want to want things? The wants you are able generate has a lot to do with your psychology. Maybe you can have second-order desires about 1st-order desires that you already have, but maybe you can't have second-order desires about 1st-order desires you don't have. Can you "will" a 1st-order desire into existence? Maybe you can only shuffle what you have.
